Ceasefire Management

Ceasefire Management

Katie Hetherington: Hello and welcome to this session on ceasefire management. My name is Katie Hetherington, and I'm a program manager at the Public International Law and Policy Group. Today, I'm very pleased to welcome Frederick Lorenz, who is a Senior Legal Advisor at the Public International Law and Policy Group, as well as Dr. Greg Noone, Executive Director at PILPG. They’re both here to discuss the management and implementation of ceasefires. Welcome both. 

What is ceasefire management?

So Greg, to begin our session today, what is ceasefire management? 

Dr. Greg Noone: Ceasefire management is the process through which the conflict parties coordinate and supervise the implementation of terms set out in the ceasefire agreement and handle, frankly, the inevitable incidents that will arise during this process. 

So, the implementation of a ceasefire always requires the conflict parties to agree on how their ceasefire will be managed. The most common and effective way of managing a ceasefire is through a system of joint ceasefire management in which the conflict parties work together to implement the terms of the agreement.

So, this requires the creation of a new institutional and organizational arrangement, in particular the formation of a joint commission. Which can go by many different names, but most often is labeled the Joint Military Ceasefire Commission or the Joint Ceasefire Commission. The Joint Ceasefire Commission can involve an integrated command body or system of liaison officers, and is tasked with holding the parties to the obligations agreed in the content of the ceasefire.

So, the Joint Ceasefire Commission oversees the ceasefire implementation process, but always reports to the conflict parties higher political authorities. In other words, those responsible for the overall peace process. It's composed of representatives from both conflict parties, though it may often be chaired by a neutral third party.

It is a military body, though it can sometimes be supported by civilians in civil society groups, and we'll discuss that further in future videos. 

Joint Military Ceasefire Commissions

Katie Hetherington: Greg, can you talk more about these joint military ceasefire commissions for us?

Dr. Greg Noone: Sure, and the Joint Military Ceasefire Commission or Joint Ceasefire Commission, as I said, can go by many different names, but they require planning and investment to build the necessary institutional capacity. So, members of the committee typically require training and capacity building, which is an important part of the process.

Often, third parties will play a role in developing these capabilities of the parties, so they can work effectively together in the committee. This is particularly the case with regards to preparing the non-state groups who typically lack the skills, education, and training of the state forces. So ideally, the ceasefire agreement should define the structure of the ceasefire management bodies, and indicate the key steps to be taken to implement the ceasefire.

But, there's always some ambiguity in the specific details on who does what, when, and how. And this must be negotiated and agreed upon by the conflict parties within the joint military ceasefire commission. And this commission also allows the parties to handle the inevitable incidents that arise and creates a forum where parties can discuss and negotiate their different preferences and understandings on how the process should develop.

So without a functioning ceasefire management system, it's going to be very hard to effectively implement a ceasefire.

Why is ceasefire management so important?

Katie Hetherington: With that context, regarding Ceasefire management and how these commissions work, why is ceasefire management so important? 

Dr. Greg Noone: So, the period in which the parties work together to manage their preliminary ceasefire is vital, though it's an often neglected part of the transition from from war to peace.

It's unlikely that actors who contested large scale, violent conflict will be able to immediately cease violence and jump to a final settlement of the conflict. It's also very unlikely that the parties hold sufficient levels of trust, as you can imagine, in their opponent to quickly move towards peace.

So instead, they need time and space to work together in order to build confidence in each other and in the process, and the capacity and capabilities to move towards peace. Another point here is that communication and connections between the parties are likely to be limited during conflict. Thus, it is through the ceasefire management process that functioning channels of communication are developed. So, this is often the first time that the parties have formerly worked together on security related issues, and thus provides a unique opportunity to prepare and practice for the ultimate settlement.

Implementation

Katie Hetherington: And Greg, can you speak more to the implementation process? 

Dr. Greg Noone: Sure, the implementation of a ceasefire is a very complex process, which requires the careful planning and sequencing of a series of increasingly challenging steps. So, this includes deciding on the application, the sequencing, the implementation procedures for the prohibitions and control  mechanisms. Including which areas will be demilitarized, which will have restrictions on the number of forces and the types of weapons, which areas will be inaccessible to different parties, which areas will be placed under control of different actors, if there any buffer zones or humanitarian corridors, if there will be additional road openings or open trade routes for civilian use, how will disengagement, redeployments, assembly, and containment of military forces occur? What about the implementation of other procedures to improve conditions for the civilian populations? How will those occur? So, these are all issues that have to be discussed with respect to the application, sequencing and implementation, because these prohibitions and control mechanisms are going to be very important.

Both sides who have just fought a very aggressive war against each other are going to want to know the specific details of what the other side, what that other armed force is going to do. Another point here is we can look at possible mutual threat reduction measures. Again, these two sides of a conflict that have fought in oftentimes a brutal, violent, and sometimes, a long war. What threat reduction measures such as no fly zones, air based lockdowns, restrictions on deployment of weapons, limitations on supply and rotation of troops? So, for instance, the military annex of the Dayton peace accords for the former Yugoslavia included a detailed 40-page description of terms, including withdrawal of forces, a four kilometer zone of separation or ZOS, and a list of prohibited activities. Only I-4 could carry weapons in the zone of separation. There was a joint military commission with representatives of the three parties, but the I-4 commander had full authority over the parties and the authority to use all force necessary and proper to ensure compliance.

Rick Lorenz: I think that was a great introduction, and I can tell you that I was part of the I-4 NATO mission. I'll briefly mention that in 1995, we saw the end of, at that time, which was the most destructive and bloodiest war in Europe since World War II.

And I was part of the NATO intervention. I was a senior legal advisor, arriving just before the first of the year. I think a little bit about the structure, Greg mentioned that there was the Dayton peace agreement. And, before that, there was the ceasefire. So, this was an example of a complex mission; a large mission involving NATO arrival.

We had a ceasefire in October of 95, and then a month later, when Dayton was formed, we had a detailed Dayton peace agreement, including a 40 page military annex. And the military annex provided the terms for the separation of forces and what will happen in that.

I'll mention that there was some phased movement of parties. I was there for the first 90 days when we not only had removal of weapons and removal of parties from the zone, we also had a shifting of lines. In Sarajevo, the line had to be shifted to move to the east, where there were Serb areas that eventually resulted in the departure of about 12,000 Serbs from that area. And that was all something we were involved in the implementation parts and in regard to the actual monitoring, not only the ceasefire, but the full implementation of the date and peace agreement.

Dr. Greg Noone: Yeah, thank you Rick for bringing this to life, because this concept of having a planned and phased compliance is necessary, so that all parties understand their obligations and those of their opponent. And, in the case that Rick was dealing with, there was a trilateral opponent.

So, it's important that parties own and remain responsible for this process, rather than delegating all of this to a third party. Though third parties can take on important functions, including chairing and monitoring the verification body, training of monitoring teams, providing necessary expert advice, participating in verification and monitoring teams as well as  training the teams and sometimes providing some form of security guarantee. So, the specific role of third parties in any context is something that should be negotiated between the conflict parties and clearly defined in an agreement.

So, developing a system of ceasefire management, in particular the formation of a joint military ceasefire commission, is therefore a vital part of the implementation process that must not be rushed or overlooked. 

Contextual examples and final takeaways

Katie Hetherington: Thank you both. Now, before we reach the end of our discussion on ceasefire management, I'll pause for a moment and see if there's anything either of you would like to add.

Rick Lorenz: I could give you a couple of examples of the things that I was dealing with at the NATO headquarters. And again, we were the military force with extraordinary authority to make the final decisions if the parties can't agree. And that was one of the positive aspects of the Bosnia mission, the I-4 mission.

I recall once where we had a question that came up about what can the parties do within the zone of separation? And they came to us, the Serbs were building bunkers in the zone of separation. Now they didn't have any weapons with them, but the question was whether a bunker meets the requirements of the joint military commission and generally the military annex.

And, I recall we decided, well, no bunkers. Bunkers are a place to place weapons and it will destabilize. And so, the NATO commander used his plenary authority to say, remove your bunkers and they did. I have another example that I could provide. Towards the end of the mission, we were involved with the departure of the Serbs from areas that were under the control of the Federation, or in this case from the Bosniak group. There was considerable controversy about the removal, the departure of the Serbs. We hoped the Serbs would stay in the area that had been designated for them, but they made a voluntary decision to move and they were seeking ways to remove. We tried to get the relief agency, the UNHCR, to help with that. 

They refused because they said, no, this could be a movement that is contrary to the Dayton Peace Accords. It's basically movement of parties, and could even be viewed as ethnic cleansing. So, we were unable to get a relief organization and the Serbs offered to bring in military vehicles to voluntarily remove the Serbs who wanted to go. And so, the interesting legal question was: if military vehicles are coming through the zone of separation, is that a violation of the peace agreement? Is it a violation of the terms of the military annex? 

We talked with the commander and he decided that since he decided that the military vehicles would be allowed, however, the drivers would not wear military uniforms. And, and they were basically this movement of peoples was permitted by the NATO commander and it went smoothly.

I bring that up as an example of the case where we had that authority, the NATO commander was able to make that decision and it went smoothly. Unfortunately, about 8,000 serves left that area, but the movement itself was the best we could do under the circumstances, and it went safely. 

Dr. Greg Noone: Rick, those are outstanding real life examples of the importance of that third party. 

Right, because it'd be highly questionable whether or not those parties had the trust built up that they could not think something nefarious was afoot. And so, the third party coming in making, I think a proper assessment of removing the bunkers because what are bunkers used for, their used as fighting positions, this very delicate issue of, of military vehicles, what our military vehicles use for, to move soldiers into place.

So, to kind of thread that needle, and it's going to take a third party that people can trust and that level of trust may only be vested in that third party. It may never really truly get to that level that would be necessary to make what are calm, thoughtful, logical decisions like you just described in an area where they fought a long, bloody war and probably don't have that capacity to get to that level of thinking the other side could do without being up to something. So, those are outstanding examples.

Katie Hetherington: Thank you so much you both for bringing to life this session today on the evident intricacies of ceasefire management. To everyone watching, thank you so much for joining us. And in the next video, we will discuss interim security arrangements. Thank you both. And thank you all for watching. ​