Definitions

Nuclear Security: It relates to the protection of nuclear sites and prevention of malicious acts against nuclear facilities. For the purposes of this handbook, nuclear security also includes the safeguards to prevent the proliferation of atomic weapons technology and prevention of a nuclear catastrophe.

Goals of Nuclear Security

The goal of nuclear security within a peace process is to ensure that all nuclear materials and facilities are safeguarded against malicious activities, including theft, sabotage, or unauthorized access. It also aims to prevent both inadvertent and deliberate release of radioactive substances, which could have devastating humanitarian and environmental consequences. Beyond physical protection, nuclear security plays a crucial role in fostering mutual trust between negotiating parties and the broader international community. By committing to the non-use of nuclear weapons and implementing transparent security measures, nations signal their dedication to peaceful coexistence and responsible stewardship of nuclear capabilities. In this way, nuclear security becomes not only a technical imperative but a cornerstone of confidence-building and sustainable peace. Nuclear security may serve to:

What Nuclear Security May Serve

• Mitigate risks of a nuclear disaster: In an increasingly nuclearized world, the threat of conflict leading to nuclear obliteration is ever present. Nuclear security principles help limit the dangers posed by use of nuclear material.
• Build resilient governance for nuclear oversight: Cooperation with international institutions—such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—can strengthen national institutions responsible for nuclear safety, security, and verification. This includes transparent decision-making, legal frameworks for non-proliferation, and technical capabilities to monitor compliance.
• Promote long-term stabilization through nuclear disarmament: Reducing or eliminating nuclear arsenals under verified agreements contributes to regional and global stability. Provisions for joint inspection teams, data exchanges, and compliance reporting ensure that disarmament commitments are sustained beyond the immediate post-conflict period.
• Support nuclear facility security and reconstruction: Where nuclear facilities have been damaged, abandoned, or remain operational in conflict zones, the peace process can establish protocols for safe shutdown, rehabilitation, or continued safe operation under international oversight. Reconstruction efforts may involve repairing nuclear safety infrastructure, training personnel, and upgrading systems to meet modern safety standards.
• Prevent escalation through nuclear risk-reduction mechanisms: Direct communication channels, nuclear incident hotlines, and agreements on early warning data sharing can reduce the risk of miscalculation or accidental nuclear use. Confidence-building measures—such as reciprocal site visits—help maintain trust between former adversaries.

Why Include This Chapter

The inclusion of a Chapter on Nuclear Security in a peace agreement may serve to:

• Establish binding principles for nuclear safety, security, and non-proliferation;
• Commit to peaceful resolution of nuclear-related disputes;
• Define the roles of regional and international actors in nuclear oversight;
• Outline the management and, if needed, reconstruction of nuclear sites and nuclear reactors.

Core Issues Addressed

Most peace agreements address the following core issues in a Chapter on Nuclear Security:

• Prevention of Nuclear War: This section focuses on aspects related to nuclear weapons. It includes provisions related to parties’ commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons, as well as commitments not to use nuclear weapons, if the parties already have them and are not willing to denuclearize.
• Non-Proliferation Commitments: provides language committing one or multiple parties to not seeking to obtain a nuclear weapon.
• Peaceful Use of Nuclear Material: commits one or multiple parties to only using nuclear material for peaceful purposes, such as energy.
• Inspection: provides language on inspection of nuclear facilities to verify that a state is not using nuclear facilities and uranium enrichment for the production of a nuclear weapon.
• Confidence-Building Measures: establishes measures, which increase the parties’ confidence in each other and allows to prevent risks of a nuclear war in the event of a misunderstanding.
• Reducing Risks of Nuclear Weapons Use: outlines measures for parties to take to avoid and mitigate nuclear accidents.
• Securitization of Nuclear Sites: This section provides language for the protection of nuclear facilities. This particularly focuses on commitments not to target nuclear facilities and not use force around nuclear facilities, which could risk destabilizing them.
• Commitments to Protect Nuclear Facilities: commits parties to protecting nuclear facilities and not using force against and around nuclear facilities.
• Restoration of Safe Conditions for Operating Nuclear Facilities: outlines measures for restoring safe conditions at nuclear facilities, if the nuclear facilities have already become subject to military hostilities and thus are under risk of destabilization during the conflict.
• International Cooperation: This section expresses the parties interest in international cooperation for advancing nuclear security and non-proliferation.

Prevention of Nuclear War

Non-Proliferation Commitments

Note to Drafters: Should nuclear threats stem from the possession or threat of the development of nuclear weapons, the parties may outline their commitments to either abandon the nuclear weapons, not develop them, or commit to not using them against other parties. These commitments are particularly important in contexts where the conflict is closely connected to the development or possession of nuclear weapons by one or multiple parties. In certain contexts, the agreement can commit one or multiple parties to nuclear non-proliferation. These typically relate to situations where a party is interested in pursuing a weapon that could further endanger other states.

The Parties are committed to the elimination of the danger of a [nuclear war / nuclear disaster].  To avert the risk of a nuclear war, the [parties / designate party] will [remain committed to the principles and obligations enshrined in the the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] / [accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [and take measures to fully comply with its provisions]].

The Parties are committed to the objective of universal nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Parties must pledge not to develop, acquire, or transfer nuclear weapons.

The Parties shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.

The parties affirm that their goal is the denuclearization of [state(s)].]  The [parties / designate party] shall permanently denuclearize and dismantle its nuclear facilities.

Peaceful Use of Nuclear Material

Note to Drafters: An agreement on nuclear non-proliferation does not necessarily mean that a state cannot use nuclear material for peaceful purposes, particularly, energy. A provision explicitly committing to only using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes can avoid misunderstandings as to the use of nuclear material.

Parties agree that any nuclear program will be exclusively for civilian purposes.

Inspection

Note to Drafters: Commitments on non-proliferation alone can be insufficient to establish trust or sufficiently deter one or multiple parties from pursuing nuclear weapons. Creation of mechanisms or identifying actors that would independently verify the parties’ compliance with non-proliferation provisions are important measures for ensuring compliance and reliability.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be requested to monitor and verify the voluntary nuclear-related measures as detailed in this Agreement.  The IAEA will be requested to provide regular updates to the [Parties], [the UN Security Council], [other relevant actors].  All relevant rules and regulations of the IAEA with regard to the protection of information will be fully observed by all parties involved.

The Parties shall establish a [joint monitoring commission] to monitor and verify the compliance of [designate party / parties] to the provisions of this Agreement.  The Commission shall consist of an [equal] number of members of [both] Parties [and [number of] external experts]. 

Confidence-Building Measures

Note to Drafters: Confidence-building measures can further help the parties mitigate risks related to nuclear accidents and foster trust that they do not intend to use nuclear weapons against others.

The Parties shall engage in [bilateral] consultations on security concepts, and nuclear doctrines, with a view to developing measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at avoidance of conflict.

The Parties undertake to provide [each other] with advance notification in respect of ballistic missile flight tests.

The Parties shall make use of the hotline links [between the [governments / foreign affairs ministries] of each state] or any other appropriate communication link as mutually agreed upon between their governments for transmission of, or request for, urgent information in situations relating to the implementation of this Agreement.  The Parties may also make use of any other communication channels, including diplomatic channels depending upon the urgency of the situation.

The Parties shall periodically review the implementation of existing confidence building measures and where necessary, set up appropriate consultative mechanisms to monitor and ensure effective implementation of these measures.

Reducing Risks of Nuclear Weapons Use

Note to Drafters: Related to confidence-building measures, parties may also specifically designate measures responding to risks of nuclear accidents and responding to such accidents if they occur. These provisions avoid the risks of nuclear war that could arise from misunderstandings.

The Parties are fully committed to undertaking national measures to reduce the risks of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons [under their respective control].  The Parties further undertake to notify each other immediately in the event of any accidental, unauthorized, or unexplained incident that could create the risk of a fallout with adverse consequences for [both sides], or an outbreak of a nuclear war between the [two] states, as well as to adopt measures aimed at diminishing the possibility of such actions, or such incidents being misinterpreted
by the other.  The Parties shall [identify] / [establish] the appropriate communication mechanism for this purpose.

In the event of such an accident the Party in whose jurisdiction or control the accident has taken place will immediately take necessary measures to neutralize the radiological consequences of such an accident.

Securitization of Nuclear Sites

Commitments to Protect Nuclear Facilities

Note to Drafters: Development or use of nuclear weapons are not the only issues associated with nuclear security. The safety of nuclear facilities themselves are crucial to preventing nuclear disasters. Nuclear facilities, when located in conflict zones, can be exposed to frequent bombing and other threats that can significantly destabilize them and risk the inadvertent release of radioactive material harmful to human life and the environment. Key to protecting nuclear facilities is the parties’ commitment not to conduct military activities around or target nuclear facilities themselves.

The Parties commit to upholding nuclear security and taking measures to prevent the release of radioactive material as a result of hostilities. 

[The parties / designate party] commit[s] to not using military force or otherwise endangering the safety of [any nuclear facility] [in [location]]. 

Restoration of Safe Conditions for Operating Nuclear Facilities

Note to Drafters: Where nuclear facilities have already become damaged by military activities or have otherwise been destabilized, the parties may develop measures for the restoration of safe conditions. Such measures may include the deployment of international inspectors that could restore and confirm that the facilities are safe for operation.

The Parties shall take all necessary measures to restore and maintain safe, secure, and reliable operating conditions at [all nuclear facilities under their control], including the cessation of military activity around nuclear facilities.

The Parties shall facilitate the unimpeded access for qualified technical personnel and international inspectors, including from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The Parties shall repair and rehabilitate critical safety systems and protect the freedom of movement of facility staff. 

Nuclear facilities shall be used solely for peaceful purposes, and the Parties shall refrain from any actions that could compromise their safe operation, in full compliance with applicable international nuclear safety and security standards.

International Cooperation

Note to Drafters: In addition to the nuclear security in the respective context being discussed in the peace agreement, the parties may also include commitments to participating and advancing international non-proliferation and nuclear security.

The Parties express their readiness to conduct an active dialogue on questions pertaining to strategic stability and to promote and expedite, through their concrete actions, the processes of arms reduction and disarmament - nuclear disarmament first and foremost.  The Parties commit themselves to active cooperation for strengthening the non-proliferation regime and appeal to non-signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to accede to it.  

Further Readings

• Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (2017)
• IAEA, Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities
• Raymond Ridderhof, Nuclear Deal, Sanctions, Nuclear Diplomacy
• Peter Sokgu Yuh, Nuclear Diplomacy: Negotiating Peace on the Korean Peninsula