Handbook on Peace Agreement Draft Language

Peacekeeping and International Monitoring

Chapter [30]: Peacekeeping and International Monitoring

Introductory Notes

Peacekeeping operations are often deployed at the end of a conflict to help states make the transition to peace. Modern peacekeeping operations tend to be multi-dimensional, combining military, political, and civilian approaches to protect and preserve peace in what is often a fragile post-conflict environment. Peacekeeping may contribute to the political process through the promotion of national dialogue and reconciliation, the organization of elections, or the assistance with restoring state functions. The mission may focus on protecting civilians, especially the most vulnerable groups which may be targeted with violent reprisals if left unprotected. Peacekeepers may also help create a suitable environment for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants.

The functions of each peacekeeping mission will differ depending on the terms of the conflict, the applicable legal framework, political considerations, and details of the peace agreement. Ultimately, the position of the international community and the host state where the mission is deployed are key factors in shaping the contours of a peacekeeping mission and determining what the mission can and should achieve. While the specifics of a peacekeeping mission are typically outlined in United Nations Security Council Resolutions, similar documents, or the mandates of peacekeeping operations, peace talks leading up to a peace agreement can serve as a valuable opportunity to ensure that the parties commit to the deployment of a peacekeeping mission and agree on its mandate.

Definitions

Peacekeeping: Action undertaken by regional or international actors to maintain or restore peace in areas of conflict, help implement peace agreements, prevent the resumption of hostilities, protect groups that may be the target of violent actions and assist with (re)building the state infrastructure following conflict.

Goals of Peacekeeping

The goal of peacekeeping in a peace process is to provide security alongside political and humanitarian support to help states affected or threatened by armed conflict prevent war or transition to peace. A peacekeeping operation may serve to:

  • Reduce violence: Peacekeeping forces help to curb violence, protect civilians, and reduce property damage in conflict-affected areas.
  • Ensure compliance: Peacekeepers verify that parties are upholding the terms of their peace agreement, including by monitoring ceasefires, troop withdrawals, and disarmament.
  • Build trust: By ensuring that parties adhere to the peace agreement, peacekeepers foster trust between opposing factions.
  • Prevent conflict escalation: By creating tactical, geographical, and political barriers that prevent the resumption of hostilities, peacekeepers help avoid a return to open conflict.
  • Provide humanitarian assistance and promote human rights: Peacekeeping missions can assist in ensuring that aid can reach civilians and help communities rebuild.
  • Facilitate political processes: Peacekeepers assist in instituting and upholding the rule of law by promoting national dialogue and reconciliation, and may support the organization of democratic elections.

Why Include This Chapter

The inclusion of a Peacekeeping Chapter in a peace agreement may serve to:

  • Ensure that the parties commit to the deployment of peacekeepers and agree on their role in the peace process;
  • Determine the contours of the mandate of the peacekeeping operation to avoid future uncertainty;
  • Ensure that peacekeeping is integrated into the broader peace process and that the latter is planned taking into consideration the presence of international troops on the ground;
  • Reassure parties that the terms of the agreement will be monitored fairly and reduce the risk of one side violating the terms.

Modalities and Requests

Peace agreements that envisage peacekeeping activities usually include an invitation to one or more regional or international organizations to arrange for the peacekeeping operation within the mandate set forth in the agreement. Parties may include a request in the peace agreement for the United Nations Security Council to pass a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to establish a UN peacekeeping force. Peace agreements may also include specific requests directly to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (“OSCE”) (e.g. to deploy personnel to oversee elections) or to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (“NATO”) (e.g. to constitute and deploy a military force to ensure compliance with the terms of the peace agreements), or may envisage that the peacekeeping mission is coordinated through an appropriate regional entity (e.g. the European Union or African Union). It may also be the case that the UN or other organizations with a role in the peace process asks the negotiating parties to include a peacekeeping operation as part of the peace agreement.

Core Issues Addressed

Provisions in a Peacekeeping Chapter included in peace agreements typically address the following core issues:

  • Definitions: This section defines key terms and ensures that the parties share a mutual understanding of the terminology used throughout, thereby avoiding ambiguity.
  • Authorization of forces: This section confirms the parties’ consent to the deployment of a peacekeeping operation to aid the state, and sets out the legal basis and applicable legal framework for the operation.
  • Legal Basis: invites the United Nations Security Council to pass a resolution establishing the peacekeeping operation and authorizing the operation to undertake the activities set out in the peace agreement.
  • Applicable Legal Framework: identifies the relevant agreements and laws that apply to the peacekeeping operation and the peacekeeping force.
  • Functions of the Mission: This section sets out the powers granted to the peacekeeping mission to achieve its mandate. Peace agreements may differ as to the specific functions of the peacekeeping mission, but typically involve the following:
    • Ceasefire Monitoring;
    • Establishing Buffer Zones;
    • Separation of Forces;
    • Arms Collection and Stockpile Monitoring;
    • Protection of Civilian Infrastructure;
    • Protection of Civilian life;
    • Demobilization Assistance;
    • Transfer of Security Responsibilities to Local Authority;
    • Timelines.
  • Mandate of the Mission: This section discusses the contours of the mandate of the peacekeeping mission, including:
    • Providing Security For Peace Monitors and Observers;
    • Accountability for Attacks Against Peacekeepers;
    • Immunities From National Law;
  • Coordination with Local Authorities
  • Coordination with Civil Society
Draft Language:

Definitions

Note to Drafters: Successful peace agreements typically ensure that the parties have the same understanding of the agreement’s terms. One way to promote consistent interpretation of a peace agreement is to include provisions defining key terms. Some terms that may be defined are suggested below, but others can be included depending on the specific needs of the particular agreement.

Definitions
The following definitions shall serve as interpretation principles under the present Agreement: 

[Name / acronym of peacekeeping mission / institution / force] – [designate definition];
Buffer Zone – [designate definition];
Ceasefire – [A temporary cessation of hostilities, which may also be undertaken as part of a larger negotiated settlement.  A ceasefire marking the permanent end of war is referred to as an armistice];
Civilian Infrastructure – [designate definition];
Conflict Parties - [designate definition];
Parties – [designate definition];
Peacekeeper(s) – personnel associated with [insert peacekeeping institution / mission / force];
Draft Language:

Functions of the Mission

Ceasefire Monitoring

Note to Drafters: A key responsibility of the peacekeeping force is often to monitor adherence to a ceasefire agreement. Effective monitoring helps to reduce violence and promote the trust-building required to negotiate a lasting peace, including by providing accurate information about ceasefire compliance.

Monitoring is typically more effective when it involves the conflict parties (rather than being entirely internationally led), as this increases engagement and enhances the resolution building potential of the monitoring activities. Additionally, each conflict context is unique, and it is therefore dangerous to rely on an overly-prescriptive template for designing the architecture of a peacekeeping institution’s ceasefire monitoring obligations. Ceasefire verification is a related, yet distinct, process to monitoring whereby a verification institution has additional powers to investigate, and in some cases sanction, alleged violations. In certain situations, it may be appropriate to include additional provision for ceasefire verification.

Option 1: Ceasefire monitoring by peacekeeping institution
The [name of peacekeeping institution] shall:

 on an ongoing basis, monitor [and verify] the implementation of the ceasefire [and investigate violations].

[verify periodically, not less than twice a month, that the terms of the ceasefire are being implemented, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.

verify ceasefire compliance within 48 hours of a request by either Party.

report their findings to both Parties.]

report to, consult, and coordinate as appropriate with all other relevant monitoring institutions or implementation mechanisms provided for in this Agreement.

[deploy its personnel and equipment at the sites determined by the conflict parties in the annexes to this Agreement.]
 	
The [name of peacekeeping institution] operating in the [ceasefire defined area] will enjoy freedom of movement and other facilities necessary for the performance of their tasks.
Option 2: Ceasefire monitoring, investigation, and reporting by Joint Monitoring Commission
A Joint Monitoring Commission (hereinafter termed the JMC) shall be established at the national level to be chaired by [peacekeeping mission lead], with representatives from each of the Parties [or representatives to be chosen by [peacekeeping mission] should one or more Parties not appoint a representative].

The JMC shall receive, investigate, and take appropriate action on reports of violations of the ceasefire.  The Parties agree to the definition of ceasefire violations as contained in [location where this definition is provided].
Option 3: Dispute resolution by Joint Monitoring Commission
The JMC shall address and seek to resolve any problem arising out of the implementation of the ceasefire, discuss any violations reported, and refer to the Parties any unresolved problems.

Establishing Buffer Zones

Note to Drafters: Buffer zones can be either temporary or long-term and are necessary in certain circumstances to prevent conflict escalation, build confidence between parties in conflict, and allow for the peacekeeping institution to effectively monitor and verify compliance with the peace process.

Option 1: Buffer zone implemented by peacekeeping institution
[Name of peacekeeping institution] shall immediately establish a force to secure the ceasefire, create a zone of separation [geographical location if applicable] between the Parties, and thus provide a safe corridor for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and free movement of persons.
Option 2: Peacekeeping institution assisting with establishing buffer zone
[Name of peacekeeping institution] shall assist the Parties with the establishment and enforcement of the buffer zones as formulated in accordance with [section] of this Agreement.
Option 3: Buffer zones not having been, or not fully, formulated beforehand
[Name of peacekeeping institution], should it consider the establishment of buffer zones as beneficial to the objective of building a sustainable peace in the region, shall, in consultation with the Parties, assist in devising and demarking buffer zones.  Once the buffer zones have been defined, the Parties and the [name of peacekeeping institution] shall, in short order, negotiate an agreement in respect of the establishment and operation of said buffer zones.

[Name of peacekeeping institution] shall assist with the establishment of the buffer zone by:

entering the evacuated areas as the Parties’ armed forces withdraw to establish interim and temporary buffer zones for the purpose of maintaining a separation of forces. [Name of peacekeeping institution’s] deployment will precede the movement of any other personnel into these areas.

[monitoring that the Parties are upholding their obligations in respect of the buffer zone by:

Actively patrolling the buffer zone and reporting [to X] on the presence of any forces of any Party or any other armed groups and / or militia.

Establishing observation posts within the buffer zone, from which it shall monitor compliance.

Operating checkpoints to control access to the buffer zone in accordance with the terms of this Agreement.

Reporting on any military activities conducted by any Party or any armed group or militia.

Reporting on any carrying of weapons by any person who is not a member of a peacekeeping institution, except in accordance with the provisions for policing contained in this Agreement.

Monitoring policing activities [by X], and / or performing policing functions as defined in this Agreement [in sections x y z].

Leveraging its unique access rights within the buffer zone to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid both within the buffer zone and ensuring the security of aid when transported within the buffer zone.

Providing specialist de-mining units as required to assist with de-mining and reducing the threat of landmines and explosive remnants of war more generally.

Providing military liaison services – via specialist officers, including to facilitate ongoing negotiations between the Parties in the pursuance of conflict resolution, improved communications, and confidence building.

Employing their best efforts to prevent any violation of its terms.]

[Supply of the peacekeeping missions installations, visits for technical and administrative purposes, and replacement of personnel and equipment situated in the sites, may occur uninterruptedly from the [name of peacekeeping institution] check points to the perimeter of the technical installations, after checking and being escorted by only the [name of peacekeeping institution].]

Separation of Forces

Note to Drafters: It is best practice to entrust the peacekeeping force with a mandate to oversee the separation of forces. The peacekeeping force may be best able to undertake this role by working with the conflict parties, but may also need authority to direct troop movements around and away from the combat area.

Separation of forces
The [name of peacekeeping institution] shall use its best efforts to assist with the implementation and monitoring of the separation of forces, in line with the relevant provisions of this Agreement.

The [title of leader of peacekeeping institution] shall form an [Implementation Team] consisting of [insert name of peacekeeping institution], representatives of the Parties, and international partners as appropriate.

The [implementation team] shall visit all positions (with the appropriate Party member only) occupied by each Party’s forces of a battalion size or larger, in order to provide information to the Parties’ commanders, and plan for the implementation of this Agreement.

For the movement of armed soldiers, rotation and relief of units, and withdrawal of units from the area, a notification shall be given [72] hours in advance to [name of peacekeeping institution] and shall be approved by [name of peacekeeping institution].

For the movement of munitions and weapons systems to, within and from the area a notification shall be given [72] hours in advance to [name of peacekeeping institution] and shall be approved by [name of peacekeeping institution].

[Name of peacekeeping institution] shall ensure that the movement and activities of the respective forces of the Parties in their areas of control is in accordance with the rules set out in this Agreement.

Arms Collection and Stockpile Monitoring

Note to Drafters: A key function for the peacekeeping force to fulfil is the collection and storage of arms and the continued and regular monitoring of arms stockpiles. Peace agreements therefore typically provide a detailed schedule of how surrendered arms are to be handled post-disarmament.

Arms collection and stockpile monitoring
[Parties] shall [relevant timeframe] and [relevant conditions] disarm and surrender their [details on relevant weaponry] to [peacekeeping institution] at [the designated collection points].  [Peacekeeping institution] shall oversee the phased placement of [Parties’] weapons, arms and ordinance in the [Designated Sites], establish secure storage facilities for collected arms and conduct [detailed timings] [audits] to ensure the integrity and security of these stockpiles and to verify the accuracy of stockpile records and ensure compliance and prevent unauthorized access.

Protection of Civilian Infrastructure

Note to Drafters: Peace agreements typically include a mandate for peacekeeping institutions to protect and/or monitor civilian infrastructure, which is necessary for the safety and welfare of civilian populations. This could be in the form of active protection and/or passive monitoring.

Option 1: Institution mandated to protect infrastructure
[Peacekeeping institution] is mandated to [details of measures to be taken] to protect civilian infrastructure including [but not limited to] [relevant infrastructure, e.g.: schools, hospitals, and / or utilities].   [Peacekeeping institutions] will [conduct regular patrols and inspections] [work closely with the local authorities] to ensure the safeguarding of these facilities.
Option 2: Monitoring Parties’ agreement
[The Parties] agree to refrain from any acts of hostility against civilian infrastructure, including [relevant infrastructure, e.g. schools, hospitals, and/or utilities].  [Peacekeeping institution] will monitor compliance and [measures to be taken] to protect these facilities.

Protection of Civilian Life

Note to Drafters: Peace agreements typically mandate the peacekeeping institution or force to protect civilians and/or monitor compliance with the parties’ agreement not to harm civilians. This could be in the form of passive monitoring or active protection from physical violence. In some situations, the peacekeeping force may be authorized to use armed force, but the limits of when armed force can be used by a peacekeeping force are usually set out in supplementing agreements, rather than the peace agreement itself.

Option 1: Monitor Parties’ commitment
The Parties re-affirm their commitment to the protection of civilian life.  The Parties and [state] agree that they shall not endanger civilian life and shall take all appropriate steps to protect civilians from harm.  [Peacekeeping institution] shall monitor the Parties’ [and [state’s]] compliance with this provision.
Option 2: Protect civilians from physical violence
[Peacekeeping forces] shall take appropriate steps to protect civilians in [state] that are under imminent threat of physical violence.  This includes using armed force where necessary and appropriate, provided that any use of armed force is in accordance with the [DUF / ROE / SOFA / SOMA].

Demobilization Assistance

Note to Drafters: A key tenet of any peace agreement is the process by which parties demobilize combatants post-disarmament and facilitate their return to civilian life.

Demobilization assistance
The [peacekeeping institution] will facilitate the demobilization of combatants, ensuring their safe transport to [location / details] where they will receive necessary assistance, including access to [services, e.g., health care, counseling, education, and vocational training programs] to aid their reintegration into civilian life.

Transfer of Security Responsibilities to Local Authority

Note to Drafters: Peace agreements may include language to facilitate the transfer of security responsibilities to the relevant government authorities in the respective state.

Transfer of security responsibilities
The Parties agree on the need for the deployment of an [security force] in [jurisdiction].

[Immediately upon] signing this agreement, the Parties shall establish the [relevant security unit] to supervise, monitor, and verify the implementation of the Agreement.

The Parties undertake, upon signature of the present Agreement, to establish [security unit[s] for [period].  [[Security unit] shall be under the supervision of [institution] [and may seek the technical support of [institution]]].

The Parties recognize that primary responsibility for enforcing law and maintaining public safety falls with [security force] who shall carry out its duties in accordance with the law and acceptable standards;

[The [security unit] established by this Agreement shall have [powers] [and from the time of its establishment shall be [the only security presence] in [jurisdiction] [with the exception of [exception]].

Timelines

Note to Drafters: The timeline is typically fact-specific and dependent on the mandate of the peacekeeping operation. It would ideally allocate the execution responsibility and funding sources for the various phases of the process, in order to reduce ambiguity and ensure consistency of expectation between the various participants in the process.

Timelines
Immediately upon signing this Agreement, the Parties shall:

invite the [UNSC / Regional Entity] to make a resolution authorizing the [peacekeeping institution] to be created and deployed in [state].
[request NATO to deploy a peacekeeping force to [state.]]
[request the OSCE to deploy personnel to [state]].

By [date], the [peacekeeping operation / forces] shall be deployed to [state].

By [date], [responsible entity] shall [milestone, such as complete demilitarization, withdrawal of troops, holding elections].  [The [milestone] shall be funded by [source of funds, such as national budget, UN, voluntary contributions].
Draft Language:

Mandate of the Mission

Providing Security for Peace Monitors and Observers

Note to Drafters: Peacekeepers are usually deployed in volatile and dangerous conditions. Most peace agreements therefore require the parties, and particularly the state in which the peacekeeping mission is operating, to commit to taking steps to protect the safety and security of peacekeepers. This duty is also recorded in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel 1994.

Providing security for peace monitors and observers
The Parties shall act in accordance with the terms of the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel 1994 in their treatment of [peacekeeping mission].

In particular, [state] shall commit to taking all appropriate measures to:

protect the safety and security of all peacekeepers, observers and associated personnel operating within its territory, as well as the premises and property equipment of [peacekeeping institution / force];
prosecute any individuals or groups within the jurisdiction of [state] that commit a crime against the [peacekeeping institution / force], peacekeepers, observers or associated personnel, and punish those found guilty with an appropriate penalty; and
cooperate with Parties in any case where the country is unable itself to take the required measures.

Accountability for Attacks Against Peacekeepers

Note to Drafters: Attacks on peacekeepers not only undermine international peace and security but also erode the credibility and deterrent effect of peace operations. These acts—whether targeted ambushes, improvised explosive devices, or coordinated assaults—are not isolated incidents but recurring threats in many mission settings. Despite the existence of legal frameworks under international humanitarian law and the obligations outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 2589 (2021), impunity remains widespread. For this reason, parties to peace agreements and mandate drafters may wish to include explicit accountability provisions not only as a legal safeguard but as a strategic deterrent. Clear language affirming that attacks against peacekeepers will be investigated and prosecuted—whether by national courts, hybrid mechanisms, or international tribunals—can help reinforce the protective environment around peace operations. Such clauses also serve to reaffirm the host state's commitment to the rule of law and its partnership with the international community. In volatile contexts, where peacekeepers are deployed to protect civilians and stabilize fragile settings, accountability provisions are not merely symbolic—they are essential to preserving operational integrity and preventing future violence.

Accountability for Attacks Against Peacekeepers
Option 1: Host State Responsibility 
The [host state] shall take all appropriate measures to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate crimes committed against peacekeepers, in accordance with its national laws and international obligations.

Option 2: UN Support for Accountability
The United Nations shall support and facilitate capacity-building, technical assistance, and coordination with [host state] authorities to ensure effective investigation and prosecution of crimes against peacekeepers.

Option 3: Referral to International Mechanisms
In cases where the [host state] is unwilling or unable to prosecute, the matter may be referred to [appropriate international mechanism], in accordance with applicable legal frameworks.

Immunities From National Law

Note to Drafters: Peacekeeping operations and their personnel are usually granted diplomatic immunity as they carry out their functions. Such diplomatic immunity is provided for in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. UN personnel also benefit from provisions of the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. In addition, NATO personnel may be granted specific immunities. Provisions granting such immunity may be included in other related agreements, such as the SOMA or SOFA, instead of the peace agreement itself.

Option 1: Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
The Parties shall accord [name of peacekeeping institution] and its premises, archives, and other property the same privileges and immunities as a diplomatic mission under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.   Peacekeepers and their families shall also enjoy the same privileges and immunities as are enjoyed by diplomatic agents and their families under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
Option 2: 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations
The Parties shall accord [name of peacekeeping institution] and its premises, archives, and other property the same privileges and immunities as described in Article II and III of the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.  Peacekeepers and their families the privileges and immunities described in Sections 18 and 19 of the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.
Option 3: NATO immunity
NATO shall be immune from all legal processes, whether civil, administrative, or criminal.  NATO personnel, under all circumstances and at all times, shall be immune from the Parties' jurisdiction in respect of any civil, administrative, criminal, or disciplinary offenses which may be committed by them in [territory].  The Parties shall assist states participating in the [name of NATO peacekeeping force] in the exercise of their jurisdiction over their own nationals.  NATO personnel shall be immune from any form of arrest, investigation, or detention by the authorities in [territory].  NATO personnel erroneously arrested or detained shall immediately be turned over to NATO authorities.
Draft Language:

Coordination with Local Authorities

Note to Drafters: Successful peacekeeping operations require effective cooperation with local authorities. Peace agreements often expressly require local authorities to assist peacekeeping missions in their functions (for instance, through ensuring free movement throughout the territory, sharing information and procuring equipment). In exchange, peace agreements tend to require peacekeepers to commit to abiding by national laws and not impeding activities of local authorities (provided they are consistent with the peace agreement).

Draft Language: Coordination with Local Authorities
[Local Authorities] shall permit [peacekeeping institution][, peacekeeping military force] and the peacekeepers unrestricted access into and movement throughout [territory].

[Local Authorities], and any associated personnel, shall fully cooperate in good faith with [peacekeeping institution][and [peacekeeping military force]] in undertaking their mandate and responsibilities as set out in this [Agreement].  Such cooperation includes, but is not limited to, establishing and maintaining regular communication channels, promptly sharing information, and providing any other assistance as requested by [[ peacekeeping institution][and / or [peacekeeping military force]] with regard to transportation, subsistence, accommodation, equipment and other facilities required for carrying out its functions.

In carrying out [its / their] functions in this [Agreement], [peacekeeping institution] / [peacekeeping military force] and the peacekeepers shall not impede the operations of [Local Authorities] and shall respect the applicable national laws, provided that the [Local Authorities’] operations and the national laws are compatible with the terms and spirit of this peace agreement.

Coordination with Civil Society

Note to Drafters: Peacekeepers often rely on community cooperation to maintain security and stability. Civil society can act as a bridge between peacekeepers and local populations, providing information, facilitating trust, and addressing local grievances.

Coordination with Civil Society
Civil society shall support [peacekeeping operation] by facilitating communication between [peacekeeping force] and local communities.

Civil society organizations shall assist in identifying and addressing potential sources of conflict at the community level, working collaboratively with [peacekeeping mission] to develop preventive strategies.

[Peacekeeping force] shall consult civil society representatives in regular forums to ensure local needs and perspectives are integrated into operational plans.

Further Readings

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