PILPG Ukraine Drafting Notes: Peacekeeping

Establishing a Peacekeeping Force for the Temporarily Occupied Territories

The deployment of a neutral peacekeeping force may be necessary to ensure security and stability during the interim period.  A well-structured and clearly defined peacekeeping operation can help maintain order and prevent the resurgence of hostilities in temporarily occupied territories.  Several key issues are usually considered during negotiations concerning the establishment of such a force:

• International organization to oversee the mission:  Identifying the organization responsible for managing and coordinating the peacekeeping operation.

• Composition of forces:  Deciding on the makeup of the peacekeeping forces, including contributions from international and regional actors.

• Mandate and scope of the mission:  Defining the specific responsibilities, rules of engagement, and areas of operation for the peacekeeping force.

• Oversight and accountability mechanisms:  Establishing processes to monitor the mission’s performance and ensure accountability for its actions.

• Duration and exit strategy:  Setting clear timelines for the mission’s duration, along with conditions for withdrawal and the transition to local control.

Identifying the Organization Responsible for Managing and Coordinating the Peacekeeping Operation

A primary decision is determining which international organization should oversee the peacekeeping mission.  When choosing the overseeing organization, it is important to balance the strategic objectives of security and stability with the need for a peacekeeping force with regional and international credibility.  Possible international organizations are:

• United Nations (UN):  A UN-led peacekeeping mission could offer broad international legitimacy and neutrality, with multinational forces drawn from member states.  It would likely be seen as the most impartial option, potentially acceptable to a wide range of international actors.  It may, however, be handicapped by Russia’s position on the Security Council.  To avoid this situation, Ukraine may pursue a UN Peacekeeping Force with Limited Powers but Strong Deterrence through a UN General Assembly mandate, bypassing a Russian Security Council veto.  Challenges for such a pathway would include limited enforcement powers.

• North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO):  NATO could provide a highly organized and capable force, leveraging its experience in post-conflict stabilization.  However, it may be viewed as a biased actor given the alliance’s military strength and geopolitical alignment and is unlikely to be acceptable to Russia.

• European Union (EU):  The EU could lead a peacekeeping operation, particularly focusing on regional stability and security, that might emphasize reconstruction and governance for its key political and economic partners.  Similarly to the NATO option, this could also be unacceptable to Russia. 

• Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE):  The OSCE, with its established presence and experience in monitoring regional conflicts, could lead a peacekeeping mission with a focus on conflict resolution and diplomacy.  This option could be seen as less provocative, given the OSCE’s focus on cooperation and security across Europe.

• Ad Hoc Framework:  An ad hoc peacekeeping framework could be established by a coalition of willing states, often acting outside of formal international organizations.  This approach allows for flexibility in selecting contributors and tailoring the mission’s mandate to the specific needs of the armed conflict.  While such a framework could be more responsive and agile, it may struggle to achieve broad international legitimacy and ensure the neutrality of its participants, as the coalition’s composition could be perceived as favoring one side over the other.

Deciding on the Makeup of the Peacekeeping Forces, Including Contributions from International and Regional Actors

The makeup of the peacekeeping force is another critical issue that could impact the force’s success in establishing security and stability during the interim period.  A peacekeeping force could include:

• Forces from Only Neutral/Non-Aligned States:  A peacekeeping force composed of neutral powers from countries like India, Brazil, and South Africa, supplemented by select neutral European nations, could form the core of the peacekeeping mission.  Forces from only neutral states may be more acceptable to certain international players.  However, some parties may still seek to influence the selection of forces to serve their interests, which could lead to challenges in ensuring a truly neutral operation.

• Forces Including Those from Allies:  A state may prefer the involvement of its allies to ensure the mission’s strength and credibility.  However, the occupying state and its allies may object to the inclusion of these allied forces in a peacekeeping mission.

• Regional Forces:  In this model, peacekeeping could be entrusted to regional forces, such as mainly European states.  This model puts emphasis on European states as the main guarantors of peace on the continent.  

• Dual Multinational Force Approach:  Should the peacekeeping force be introduced into a multi-tiered separation of forces structure (see Separation of Forces and Demilitarized Zones chapter under “Method for Separation of Forces”), Ukraine and Russia could introduce two separate multinational forces in each of their respective zones.  For example, the European Union could patrol the Ukrainian portion of the DMZ, while China could oversee the Russian side.  Having two separate forces with distinct areas of responsibility could reduce concerns about bias and create multiple layers of separation.  

Defining the Specific Responsibilities, Rules of Engagement, and Areas of Operation for the Peacekeeping Force

Peacekeepers may be tasked with any of the following roles:

• Maintaining Security:  Peacekeepers may assist local authorities in safeguarding civilians from violence.  They may also ensure that civilian administrators are able to conduct their work free of harassment and threats of violence.

• Preventing Renewed Hostilities:  Peacekeepers may monitor the situation on the ground and report to the broader international community on any indication that widespread violence will recur.

• Ensuring Stability:  The presence of peacekeepers as forces tasked with preventing the recurrence of violence may help foster greater reconciliation between communities at odds during the conflict.  Peacekeepers may also ensure that violations of human rights are not being committed.

• Overseeing Disarmament:  Peacekeepers may assist with ongoing disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs.  These are designed to remove former combatants from militia-like environments and help them reacclimate to civilian life.

• Election Supervision:  Peacekeepers may monitor any indications of election-related violence or intimidation, and may act as poll monitors to ensure that civilians feel empowered to exercise their right to vote.

• Transitional Governance:  The peacekeeping mission could assist with elements of transitional governance, such as facilitating democratic processes and ensuring the delivery of humanitarian aid.  These roles and responsibilities would overlap with the mandate of any interim international administration established.

• Demining Efforts:  As part of their broader responsibilities, peacekeepers may oversee or directly participate in demining operations.  

Establishing Processes to Monitor the Mission’s Performance and Ensure Accountability for its Actions

Peacekeeping missions may face issues of misconduct or failure to adhere to international standards.  Provisions for independent oversight of the peacekeeping operation could help prevent such issues.  Possible oversight and accountability mechanisms are:

• Independent Monitoring:  Independent oversight mechanisms may be established to regularly monitor the conduct of peacekeepers, ensuring they adhere to international standards and mandates.  These mechanisms may report on mission performance, investigate allegations of misconduct, and provide transparency to the international community.

• Complaint Mechanism:  A formal complaints process within the independent oversight mechanism may be created, allowing local populations to report any misconduct or abuse by peacekeepers.  This system would ensure that complaints are investigated independently, with clear procedures for accountability and feedback to the affected communities.

• Periodic External Audits:  Peacekeeping missions may be subject to regular audits by external review teams composed of international experts.  These teams would assess the mission’s adherence to human rights standards, operational efficiency, and overall compliance with its mandate.

• Human Rights Observers:  Independent human rights monitors may be deployed alongside peacekeepers to observe their activities and ensure that they are not engaging in any actions that violate international law or the mission’s mandate.  These observers may also report back to the international community on any abuses or violations.

• Deconfliction and Regular Meetings:  To ensure that the peacekeeping force does not inadvertently escalate tensions or misunderstandings, deconfliction measures could be built into the mission.  The head of the peacekeeping force or secretariat could organize regular meetings with the relevant government officials to monitor the situation, address any concerns, and ensure that the peacekeeping mission remains aligned with its objectives.  

Setting Clear Timelines for the Mission’s Duration, Along With Conditions for Withdrawal and the Transition to Local Control

Similar to an interim international administration, a peacekeeping mission’s duration will need to be clearly defined.  Duration and exit strategy could take the following formats:

• Fixed Duration with Scheduled Reviews:  The mission could have a fixed duration of a specified number of years, with scheduled reviews every 6 to 12 months to assess the security situation and progress towards established benchmarks, allowing adjustments based on the evolving context.

• Phased Withdrawal Strategy:  The exit strategy could involve a phased withdrawal, where peacekeepers gradually reduce their presence as specific conditions are met, such as the successful completion of disarmament programs and stabilization of local governance.

• Conditional Exit Criteria:  The exit strategy could define specific criteria that must be met before peacekeepers withdraw, including the establishment of local governance structures, effective law enforcement capabilities, and a demonstrated commitment to upholding human rights.

• International Oversight and Assessment:  An independent international oversight body could monitor the progress of the peacekeeping mission and assess when it is appropriate to transition to a post-peacekeeping phase, providing recommendations based on ground realities.