PILPG Ukraine Drafting Notes: Security Structure

Security Structure

When addressing the post-war security structure, there are a number of issues to consider:

• Source of the Security Structure:  Establishing whether the security structure is based on NATO membership or some bilateral or multilateral security guarantees. 

• Scope of NATO Membership:  If the security structure is based on NATO membership, the geographic scope of Article 5 protection will need to be decided. 

• Security Guarantees within Bilateral or Multilateral Agreements:  If the security structure is based on bilateral or multilateral agreements, the guarantees that are included within the agreement’s protection would need to be defined. 

• Alternative Regional Security Structures:  In addition to NATO membership and bilateral and multilateral agreements, Ukraine can also explore alternative regional security structures. 

• Process for Triggering Assistance:  To avoid creating loopholes in the security structure that could lead to the established security structures failing to provide for Ukraine’s security, the specific mechanism by which assistance is triggered is paramount.  

Source of the Security Structure

Determining the foundation of post-war security structure—whether it rests on full NATO membership, bilateral agreements with specific allies, or multilateral security pacts—will be pivotal in defining the scope and effectiveness of the guarantees.

• NATO Membership:  NATO membership would offer the most robust and formal security guarantee, ensuring full integration into the collective defense system of the Alliance.  However, this could face opposition from NATO members concerned about the risks of becoming parties to the war.

• Bilateral or Multilateral Security Agreements:  Bilateral or regional agreements could offer a more flexible and potentially quicker solution, with countries like the U.S. or the U.K. providing defense commitments outside the NATO framework, including the possible stationing of troops, providing air defense, and robust commitments, similar to US commitments to Israel, Japan, and South Korea.  Under bilateral or multilateral security agreements, Ukraine could still cooperate with NATO member states.  However, while these agreements may provide immediate support, they lack the universal guarantee of NATO’s Article 5, meaning they may not be as comprehensive or reliable in the event of large-scale aggression.

• Alternative Regional Security Structures:  Options like the Baltic-Black Sea Defense Alliance, GUAM, or the European Union through its Common Security and Defense Policy could provide more regionally focused security guarantees.  While not as formal as NATO, these alternatives could create strong, localized deterrents and defense structures.

• Multinational Force (e.g., Sinai Agreement Model):  A neutral multinational force, similar to the one established in the Sinai Peninsula under the Camp David Accords, could serve as a stabilizing security presence in the occupied territories.  This force would not be directly aligned with Ukraine or Russia but could provide a credible deterrent and a peacekeeping presence in Ukraine, ensuring security without escalating tensions.  The force could include contributions from states with a vested interest in regional stability and would operate in coordination with both local and international stakeholders.

• Coalition of the Willing:  This approach would involve forming a coalition of states, based on voluntary participation, committed to Ukraine’s defense.  The coalition could provide a flexible, less formalized structure that offers military assistance, training, logistical support, and intelligence sharing, creating a credible deterrent to Russian aggression.  While not a formal alliance, such a coalition would draw upon the contributions of multiple nations, ensuring a robust and diversified security framework for Ukraine.  

Scope of NATO Membership

The geographic scope of NATO’s collective defense protection under Article 5 needs to be determined to address territorial disputes and ensure clarity on what areas are covered by NATO’s security guarantees.

• Full NATO Protection for All Territory:  This would include Article 5 protection without territorial limitations.  While it would provide the strongest security assurance, this option would likely only be possible if the territorial boundaries are no longer in dispute. 

• Exclusion of Occupied Territories from Article 5 Protection:  NATO could offer membership but exclude certain areas from the Article 5 security guarantee.  This could reduce tensions, but it would compromise territorial integrity and might send a signal that NATO is willing to tolerate violations of international borders, potentially weakening NATO’s credibility.

Security Guarantees within Bilateral or Multilateral Agreements

Bilateral agreements can vary widely in terms of the commitments made, including military support, weapons provision, and defensive measures.  

• Stationing of Troops:  The agreements could involve the stationing of foreign military forces for training, defensive support, or deterrence.  This could provide an immediate military presence, strengthening defense capabilities.  

• Development of Military Facilities:  Similar to U.S. military arrangements in Saudi Arabia, Ukraine could focus on developing key military facilities that could rapidly accommodate NATO or other allied forces if needed.  This could include airstrips, hangars, storage for advanced weapons systems, and logistical infrastructure to support rapid deployment of troops and military assets.  

• Air Defense Systems and Support:  The agreements could include providing advanced air defense systems, such as surface-to-air missiles or radar systems.  This would help defend against aerial threats and strengthen overall defense capabilities. 

• Nuclear Umbrella Protection:  Extended deterrence through a "nuclear umbrella" could be offered by nuclear-armed allies, providing protection from nuclear threats. 

• Provision of Weapons and Military Equipment:  The agreements could involve the provision of advanced weapons, including tanks, fighter jets, or artillery, enhancing military capabilities.  

• Closure of Airspace:  The agreements could include commitments to close airspace to hostile aircraft, limiting aerial assaults. 

• Intelligence Sharing and Cyber Defense Support:  The agreements could include commitments to share intelligence, enhance early warning capabilities, and improve strategic responses to threats.  Additionally, cyber defense assistance could be offered to protect against cyber-attacks targeting critical infrastructure.  However, reliance on external intelligence and cybersecurity assistance could create vulnerabilities if support is not continuous or if adversaries attempt to disrupt communication networks.

• Space-Based Assets:  Space-based elements, such as satellite communication systems, intelligence gathering, and missile defense coordination, would significantly enhance Ukraine’s ability to respond to threats.  Agreements could ensure access to advanced space-based assets for surveillance, reconnaissance, and early warning systems, providing Ukraine with real-time intelligence on emerging threats.  These systems would also be crucial in identifying and deterring missile attacks or air threats, allowing for a more proactive defense posture. 

Alternative Regional Security Structures

In lieu of NATO membership or bilateral security agreements, Ukraine can also consider existing regional structures that could form the basis of its security structure. 

• European Union:  The EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy provides a robust framework for security and defense cooperation among European states.  Establishing similar structures like the Berlin Plus Agreement employed in Bosnia could significantly bolster Ukraine’s defense capabilities.  Further, should Ukraine join the EU, it will benefit from its mutual defense clause enshrined in Article 42.7 of the Treaty on the European Union, which provides that each member state can unilaterally declare that it is a victim of an attack and all other European Union member states have an obligation to come to its aid.  The specific scope of the aid, however, is subject to debate among the member states. 

• Baltic-Black Sea Defense Alliance:  Enhancing defense cooperation within the existing Baltic-Black Sea Defense Alliance structure could be another format through which Ukraine could strengthen its defense capabilities.  By pooling military resources and coordinating defense strategies, the alliance would strengthen collective deterrence and reduce the likelihood of regional instability.

• GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development:  Strengthening the GUAM organization, which includes Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, could offer an alternative regional security framework with defense cooperation and mutual defense clauses.

Process for Triggering Assistance

• Automatic Triggering of Assistance:  The agreement creating the security structure could provide that security assistance is automatically activated if Ukraine faces military aggression, similar to the wording set out in NATO Article 5 and EU Article 42.7. 

• Triggering Through Consultation:  This process is similar to the one set out in the draft Istanbul Communique negotiated in 2022 between Ukraine and Russia.  Security assistance would be activated after consensus-building among key allies.  However, such a process would become vulnerable to political dynamics in the states entrusted with providing for Ukraine’s security and create deadlocks similar to those hindering the effectiveness of the UN Security Council mechanisms. 

• Escalation-Based Triggering:  Security assistance could be triggered in stages, starting with diplomatic measures, escalating to non-military interventions (e.g., economic sanctions or cyber defense), and progressing to full military support if the situation deteriorates.  Specific thresholds would define when each stage is triggered. This might include the level of casualties, the occupation of major cities or critical infrastructure, or an explicit declaration of war from an aggressor state.  Nonetheless, this could create delays in the provision of necessary support and fail to prevent a deterioration of the situation.